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Expanding the boundaries of institutional analysis in the transitional periphery 
Dilshod Makhmadshoev 
 
<a> INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, institutional theory has provided scholars from various backgrounds with powerful 
and effective theoretical tools to probe into the post-socialist transition economies. Researchers, particularly in 
the fields of international business and small business and entrepreneurship, benefited significantly by drawing 
on neo-institutional perspectives to explore and explain the various effects of unstable institutional settings and 
embedded institutional factors on firm behaviour in these environments. However, it is highlighted here that the 
neo-institutionalist approach, and in particular the µnew institutional economics¶ lens, tends to represent the 
most dominant approach utilized by scholars with an interest in post-socialist economies. While this perspective 
remains powerful and effective to this day, this chapter proposes that research in this area can potentially benefit 
in important ways from expanding the boundaries of institutional analysis by integrating insights from two 
emerging but hitherto underexploited institutional perspectives, namely the µvarieties of transition¶ approach 
(e.g., Havrylyshyn, 2006; Lane and Myant, 2007; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011), which is an alternative to the 
mainstream comparative capitalism, and a more actor-centred perspective on institutional change, which is 
inspired by the works of Campbell (1997, 2004). 
The first key observation regarding the current thinking on institutions in the context of transition 
economies is that it has not placed adequate emphasis on emerging variations in institutional environments 
among these countries. The process of transition in post-socialist states has not followed the previously 
anticipated linear progression towards Western models of capitalism (Makhmadshoev et al., 2015). Thus, 
exploring questions relating to institutional divergence becomes ever more important. Despite the popularity of 
institutional approaches in studying transition economies, research on the transitional periphery within business 
studies has remained largely silent in acknowledging the divergent transition paths and the implications of this 
institutional divergence on firm behaviour. The second key observation is that surprisingly little attention is paid 
to the role of actors as agents of institutional change, and to the mechanisms they deploy to achieve this change. 
Thus, it is proposed here that integrating insights from comparative capitalism and a theory of institutional 
change can enrich the current thinking on institutions and the firm in the transitional periphery. 
This chapter will first provide an in-depth review of the new institutional economics (NIE) approach 
and how it is utilized in selected studies by international business (IB) and small business and entrepreneurship 
scholars with empirical focus on transition economies, highlighting its important explanatory capabilities. It will 
then introduce the two emerging institutional perspectives and highlight their relevance for the transitional 
periphery. In analysing the relevance of the varieties of transition (VoT) approach, it draws on some examples 
from empirical fieldwork conducted in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This chapter is partially based on insights 
obtained from this fieldwork in the Central Asian periphery, and further advances some of the conceptual ideas 
that were originally developed and published in contributions by Makhmadshoev et al. (2015) and 
Makhmadshoev and Crone (2014). 
 
<a>NEO-INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH (NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS) 
Institutional theory became increasingly prominent in the social sciences during the latter part of the twentieth 
century and has since attracted considerable attention from scholars in various fields, including economics, 
political science and sociology. It is widely recognized as one of the dominant approaches to understanding 
organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; Scott, 1995). It is used in examining and 
explaining the importance of the wider social and cultural environments on organizational actions, 
organizational structures and organizational practices (Dacin et al., 2002; Kostova and Roth, 2002; Scott, 2008). 
Institutional thought has also revolutionized the study of economics and economic systems, and has been 
rigorously deployed in challenging some of the core arguments of the mainstream (neoclassical) economic 
theory (Coase, 1998; North, 1990). 
Perhaps it is helpful to highlight that the body of knowledge regarded as institutional theory 
encompasses two distinctive streams: the early institutionalist approach and the neo-institutionalist approach 
(Furubotn and Richter, 2000; Scott, 1995). The development of institutional theory was initiated by the so-
called early institutionalists (pre-1970s). However, this approach is said to have attracted increased criticism for 
being largely descriptive and lacking in theory (Coase, 1998; Scott, 2008). The work of early institutionalists 
was also strongly challenged for its inadequate focus on organizations and, crucially, for its failure to make a 
distinction between institutions and organizations (Scott, 1995). As a result, a new institutionalist approach 
(neo-institutional theory) has since emerged, which puts explicit emphasis on organizations and differentiates 
institutions from organizations (North, 1990; Scott, 2008). Thus, it can be argued that much of what is 
DFNQRZOHGJHGWRGD\DVµLQVWLWXWLRQDOWKHRU\¶FRQVWLWXWHVWKHQHR-institutionalist approach. This neo-
 institutionalist approach, in turn, is dominated by two major schools of thought, broadly known as: (1) the 
µorganizational institutionalism¶ ± where institutions are viewed as inter- and intra-organizational forms, 
practices and activities that are enforced through coercive, mimetic and normative mechanisms, and which also 
tends to favour the terminology of regulative, normative and cognitive institutions (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Kostova and Roth, 2002; Scott, 1995); and (2) the µnew institutional economics¶ ± which views 
LQVWLWXWLRQVDVµWKHUXOHVRIWKHJDPH¶DQGIDYRXUVWKHWHUPLQRORJ\RIIRUPDODQGLQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQV (e.g., 
Furubotn and Richter, 2000; North, 1990, p. 3; Williamson, 1981). It is the latter which is adopted more widely 
within business and management research on transition economies. 
Though the new institutional economics (NIE) perspective is associated primarily with the works of 
Coase (1937), Williamson (1981) and North (1990), it is North who is more widely considered to have 
contributed significantly to bringing institutions to the forefront of economic development debate (North, 1987, 
1990). Furthermore, by emphasizing the distinction between institutions (rules of the game) and organizations 
(players in the game) and by categorizing institutions into formal and informal types, and incorporating their 
enforcement mechanism into the analysis, North (1990) developed and proposed a powerful analytical 
framework for the study of institutional influences on economic behaviour and performance. 
 
<b>Moving On WKURXJKWKHµRules of the *DPH¶0HWDSKRU 
,QVWLWXWLRQVDUHµthe UXOHVRIWKHJDPHLQDVRFLHW\¶ (North, 1990, p. 3). They are forms of constraints created by 
humans to shape, structure and guide individual and organizational interactions and reduce uncertainties in 
everyday exchanges. Davis and North (1971, p. 6) define aQLQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQWDVµthe set of fundamental 
political, social and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange aQGGLVWULEXWLRQ¶. 
Institutions can be formal and informal (North, 1990). Formal institutions include rules (political rules, 
economic rules, judicial rules and individual contracts), regulations, laws and written constitutions. Informal 
institutions consist of conventions, customs and social norms of behaviour, which are influenced by culture and 
are often distinctive to particular societies (North, 1990, 1991, 2005). 
The main premise of the institutional perspective advanced by North (1990, 2005) is that institutions 
influence economic performance and shape economic outcomes (Furubotn and Richter, 2000; Williamson, 
1998). It is by demonstrating the existence of positive transaction costs that the NIE thinking developed a strong 
case for challenging the mainstream (neoclassical) economic reasoning, and as a result suggested a new way of 
analysing economic systems and economic exchanges. North (1987, p. 419) states that µwhat economists have 
not realized until recently is that exchange is not costless¶. He goes on to assert that the cost of transacting is 
fundamental to the performance of economies and economic actors, including firms (North, 1987, 1990). Thus, 
transaction cost analysis has become a particularly important instrument in understanding how institutions 
influence the behaviour and performance of economic actors. µTransaction cost¶ is a broad term that includes a 
range of costs associated with creating and operating an economic system, as well as those associated with 
creating and operating a new enterprise (Furubotn and Richter, 2000). Importantly, North (1990) also 
emphasizes that transaction costs are µpart of the costs of production¶ (ibid., p. 28), and include a broad range of 
measurable costs, such as official fees and formal expenses, as well as µhard-to-measure costs¶ (ibid., p. 68), 
such as costs of acquiring information and a wide range of informal costs, such as bribes and informal 
payments. 
Uncertainty and transaction costs are the two closely interconnected dimensions in the study of 
institutions. Some degree of uncertainty, caused by political, economic or social factors, is generally present in 
any environment, which in fact explains the existence of positive transaction costs (Williamson, 1997). The role 
of institutions, as North (1990) crucially explains, is to reduce this uncertainty and provide stability when firms 
engage in a particular type of economic activity. However, this may not always be the case, as institutional 
frameworks are dynamic and evolving in nature. For uncertainty to remain low, institutions µmust be well-
designed and properly maintained¶ (Furubotn and Richter, 2000, p. 7). Therefore, in environments where 
institutions are weak or poorly implemented, uncertainty tends to be high, which in turn results in high 
transaction costs for economic actors. This assumption is particularly evident in the analysis of the institutional 
environments of the former communist countries, including those in the periphery (Makhmadshoev and Crone, 
2014; Peng and Heath, 1996; North, 1990, 1997). 
North (1987, 1990) draws particular attention to growth benefits gained from participation in trade, but 
more importantly provides an explanation as to how institutional frameworks influence the process of 
participation in trade. The NIE argues that the idea of perfect market information is highly abstract, thus 
competition in markets (or in an economy) may not always be perfect or fair (Furubotn and Richter, 2000). 
Institutional frameworks, largely through formal state policies and regulatory mechanisms, play an important 
role in establishing and maintaining competitive conditions in markets. However, institutions differ from 
country to country, therefore in societies where the rules of competition are not well established or not properly 
administered, firms may face high transaction costs and limited opportunities for growth and expansion. This 
 provides a partial explanation as to why some countries and their firms are more competitive and more 
successful when participating in international trade (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
The broader conceptualization of the institutional environment also encompasses the role of 
organizations (that is, non-firm organizations). Analysing organizations in this way, however, does not suggest 
disregarding the all-important distinction made between institutions (as the rules of the game) and organizations 
(as players of the game). North (1990) emphasizes the importance of conceptually distinguishing institutions 
from organizations. However, he further clarifies that this should not necessarily exclude organizations from the 
analysis, for sometimes it may be unreasonable to separate the analysis of the rules of the game from different 
organizations, agencies and associations that enforce, monitor and facilitate these rules. North (1990, p. 4) states 
that µwhen we examine the costs that arise as a consequence of the institutional framework we see they are a 
result not only of that framework, but also of the organizations that have developed in consequence of that 
framework¶. Thus, the analysis of institutional environments needs to focus not only on specific rules and 
norms, but can also include organizations that provide institutional support to economic actors in achieving their 
objectives and those that act as enforcers of rules and regulations. 
One of the main shortcomings of the North-inspired institutional approach relates to its 
conceptualization of informal institutions. North recognizes certain difficulties in providing a clear-cut 
definition of informal institutions, mainly because the understanding of informal institutions in the NIE often 
overlaps with the sociological perspectives on network theory (Granovetter, 1973; Murdoch, 2000) and social 
capital (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Woolcock, 1998). This chapter adheres to the understanding of 
informal institutions informed by the NIE, as it is deemed more appropriate in identifying specific informal 
institutions at the national level, particularly in transition economies, and understanding how they influence firm 
EHKDYLRXU:KDW1RUWK¶VDQGKLV1,(DVVRFLDWHV¶FRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKHZLGHULQVWLWXWLRQDOWKHRU\VXJJHVWLVWKDW
institutional environments of countries are a mix of economic, political and social structures that define and 
enforce the fundamental rules of production, interaction and exchange. This may include conditions of access to 
means of production as well as the more specific regulations concerning international trade and entry into 
specific industries. Thus, institutions not only influence the nature of activities of firms, but at a more 
fundamental level also affect the various opportunities available to them. 
 
<b>Utility of NIE in IB and SME and Entrepreneurship Research on Transition Economies 
The North-inspired institutional approach has established itself as a dominant analytical tool for understanding 
the effects of institutions in transition economies and analysing economic activities of firms in these 
environments. The distinction of formal and informal institutions has been particularly pertinent in this respect. 
The institutional approach states that economic activities of firms are influenced not only by formal rules, but 
also by a range of informal rules (North, 1990; Peng, 2003). It also suggests that when formal rules are weak 
and inefficient, informal rules become more influential and gradually replace formal rules. Given that transition 
economies are undergoing a radical structural and institutional change, especially in terms of formal institutions, 
it is informal institutions that often take over and govern economic activities in such environments (North, 1990; 
Peng and Heath, 1996). The application of an institutional approach focuses attention on how the lack of formal 
rules may lead to increased uncertainty, and thus to high transaction costs for firms (North, 1990). 
In recent years, institutions RUµDQLQVWLWXWLRQ-EDVHGYLHZ¶ have become a major focus in the IB and 
strategic management research community, alongside the more established industry-based and resource-based 
views of (international) strategy (Dunning, 2004; Meyer and Peng, 2005; Mudambi and Navarra, 2002; Peng, 
2004; Peng et al., 2008). This can be observed from a growing number of recent Special Issues on the topic of 
institutions and IB in top-ranking academic journals (notable examples include the Journal of International 
Business Studies Special Issues in 2008, Vol. 39 and 2010, Vol. 41; and the Journal of International 
Management Special Issue in 2008, Vol. 14, with specific empirical focus on transition economies) and edited 
books dedicated to the topic (a notable example includes Wood and Demirbag, 2012). Several reasons have 
been proposed as to why IB scholars should make more efforts in integrating institutional perspectives in their 
research. Firstly, it is argued that focusing on institutions could help to answer one of the major questions in IB 
research, which is, µwhat determines the international success and failure of firms?¶ (Peng, 2004, p. 106). 
Secondly, scholars acknowledge that much of the IB and strategic management research in the past has not been 
particularly interested in institutions, largely because the influence of institutions on firm activities and 
performance was not considered significant (Meyer and Peng, 2005). Considerable differences in institutional 
environments between developed, emerging and transition economies have been observed, which in turn led 
scholars to believe that µinstitutions are much more than background conditions, and that institutions directly 
determine what arrows a firm has in its quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy and to create 
competitive advantage¶ (Meyer et al., 2009, p. 61; see also Meyer and Peng, 2005; Peng et al., 2008). 
The current stream of research within IB emphasizing institutions in the context of transition 
economies has focused largely on internationalization of Western-based multinational enterprises (MNEs) into 
transition economies (Bevan et al., 2004; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Gelbuda et al., 2004; Hitt et al., 2004; Jackson 
 and Deeg, 2008; Makhmadshoev et al., 2015; Meyer, 2001; Meyer and Peng, 2005; Meyer and Vo Nguyen, 
2005; Meyer et al., 2009; Peng et al., 2008). The primary empirical focus thus far has been on some transition 
economies, such as Russia, China, and those in Central and Eastern Europe (Gelbuda et al., 2008; Meyer, 2001; 
Meyer et al., 2009; Meyer and Peng, 2005; Peng et al., 2008). Other relatively under-researched and somewhat 
peripheral transition economies, such as those in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans, are yet to be given 
adequate research attention. More importantly, perhaps, it is observed that while the growing scholarly interest 
in institutions and institutional approaches within the field of IB is a positive sign, the North-inspired NIE 
approach has been the main institutional perspective adopted by this stream of research in probing into the post-
socialist transition economies. 
A similar trend is also observed in the stream of research on entrepreneurship and small and medium-
sized enterprise (SME) development in transition economies, where the North-inspired NIE approach appears to 
be the dominant institutional framework adopted (e.g., Aidis, 2005; Estrin et al., 2008; Puffer et al., 2010; 
Smallbone and Welter, 2012; Williams and Vorley, 2017). It is argued that the development of small firms is 
influenced not only by a range of internal firm characteristics, such as µcreativity, drive and commitment of 
individuals¶, but also to a great extent by external factors created by the environments in which firms evolve and 
develop (Smallbone and Welter, 2001b, p. 64). External factors are considered especially influential for small 
firm development in transition economies, because of their weak and often ineffective institutional 
environments. For example, Smallbone and Welter (2001a, p. 260) state that µin transition economies, the 
dominant feature influencing the nature and pace of entrepreneurship and small business development is the 
external environment, which, in some cases, appears hostile in social, economic and political terms¶. 
7KHDGRSWLRQRI1RUWK¶VIUDPHZRUNKDVDOORZHGVRPHVWXGLHVWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQIRUPDODQG
informal institutional barriers. For example, barriers relating to general regulatory environments, which include 
tax rates and changes to tax regulations, are categorized as formal barriers (barriers created by formal 
institutions), whereas barriers relating to lack of law enforcement, corruption and unfair competition are 
categorized as informal barriers (barriers created by informal institutions) (Aidis, 2005; Smallbone and Welter, 
2012). Some studies also categorize social connections and networking practices as important features of the 
informal institutional environment in transition economies (Aidis, 2005; Estrin et al., 2008; Makhmadshoev and 
Crone, 2014; Smallbone and Welter, 2012), and suggest that the prevalence of these practices indicates µthe 
absence of a well-functioning formal institutional framework¶ (Estrin et al., 2008, p. 28). However, their impact 
on entrepreneurship and firm growth is viewed not only as adverse (for example, in the Russian environment) 
but also as favourable (in the Chinese environment) (Estrin et al., 2008), which suggests that it can be 
misleading to attribute informal institutional factors as barriers only. Informal institutions are indeed gaining 
more attention in this research area, as demonstrated in a recent review study by Manev and Malonova (2010), 
who call for more studies to focus on understanding informal institutional environments and their impact on 
entrepreneurship in transition economies. 
The discussions above illustrate that the neo-institutionalist approach, and in particular the North-
inspired NIE perspective, continues to provide researchers in the IB and the SME and entrepreneurship fields 
with a powerful tool to unpack the various complexities of the transitional context and grasp their varying 
implications on firms. It is argued here that this current institutional thinking on transition economies can be 
potentially further enhanced and enriched by infusing and integrating insights from the two relatively 
underexploited institutional approaches on institutional divergence and institutional change. In the sections that 
follow I attempt to demonstrate their compatibility with the dominant NIE approach, as well as their utility for 
the transitional periphery. 
 
<a>INSTITUTIONAL DIVERGENCE AND VARIETIES OF TRANSITION 
A key argument advanced by this stream of research is that not only institutions matter, but so do differences in 
institutions. While the neo-institutional approach continues to be influential and effective, recent contributions 
from other social science disciplines, particularly political economy and economic sociology, have drawn 
attention to the widening institutional divergence among transition economies. It is one of the main aims of this 
chapter to emphasize the divergent paths of transition experienced in some countries in transitional periphery 
and point to this embryonic varieties of transition (VoT) approach, also referred to as the µvarieties of post-
socialism¶ or µvarieties of capitalism in post-communist countries¶, which places emphasis on understanding the 
implications of institutional divergence in the former socialist economies on economic and social behaviour. 
The VoT takes its roots from the µvarieties of capitalism¶ (VoC) debate. The latter was originated by 
political economists (Amable, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001) and represents a dominant approach to 
comparative capitalism (CC) adopted in business and management literature. This approach helps to understand 
not only the differences in institutional structures across countries with capitalist systems (Hall and Soskice, 
2001), but also the internal diversity within national contexts (Lane and Wood, 2009). Amable (2003) states that 
the VoC thinking was originally triggered by observed differences in macroeconomic performances among the 
group of developed countries (notably the United States, European countries and Japan). A key feature of this 
 literature is the notion of institutional complementarity. According to Hall and Soskice (2001, p. 17), µtwo 
institutions can be complementary if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency 
RIWKHRWKHU¶. The extent of institutional complementarity may serve as an indicator of the diversity in 
institutional frameworks between different forms of market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). This work has 
delineated distinct national models of capitalism among developed economies, such as +DOODQG6RVNLFH¶V
(2001) division of liberal versus coordinated market capitalism. In this way, the CC literature draws the 
attention of researchers WRWKHFRPSOH[DQGGLYHUVHµtopography of instiWXWLRQDOODQGVFDSHV¶ (Jackson and Deeg, 
2008, p. 541) and suggests the need to incorporate a more sophisticated and contextually rich characterization of 
institutional environments (Michailova, 2011; Redding, 2005). 
Yet, when it comes to considering the institutional environments of transition economies, this dominant 
CC literature is silent (Makhmadshoev et al., 2015). Indeed, the relevance and applicability of the established 
CC frameworks to transition economies have been recently questioned (Havrylyshyn, 2006; Myant and 
Drahokoupil, 2012). Scholars observe that the CC literature tends to assume that institutional configurations are 
permanent or subject to only gradual change, whereas transition economies are, by their nature, subject to 
continuous institutional change and uncertainty (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2012). Furthermore, in the case of the 
former Soviet Union and especially the transitional periphery, it is observed that the transition process has not 
followed the linear progression towards the established models of capitalism, which was initially anticipated by 
policy-makers and scholars alike. Thus, as an alternative to the mainstream CC literature discussed above, 
Makhmadshoev et al. (2015) identified a distinct and emergent strand of work, though dominated by political 
scientists and economic sociologists to date, that seeks to identify, classify and accentuate varieties of capitalism 
in post-communist or transition countries (Feldmann, 2006; Lane and Myant, 2007). 
This approach basically argues that the process of transforming planned economies into well-
functioning market economies has taken a distinct trajectory in each country, and one that may be characterized 
by path-dependence. As a result, these divergent paths of transition have resulted in an institutional diversity 
among the former Soviet republics (Blackmon, 2007; Havrylyshyn, 2006). Thus, borrowing from the CC 
approach, the VoT camp identifies a number of different emerging models of capitalism in transition economies. 
For instance, Lane (2007) proposes a threefold typology comprising state-led capitalism, hybrid state/market 
uncoordinated capitalism, and the transition laggards characterized by statist economies (see Table 1.1). 
Similarly, Havrylyshyn (2006) identifies four types of transition currently prevailing in post-communist states, 
namely liberal societies, intermediate regimes, captured states and lagging reformers (see Table 1.2). 
Furthermore, Myant and Drahokoupil (2011) propose the following fivefold typology of the µvarieties of 
capitalism in transition¶: foreign direct investment (FDI)-based market economies; peripheral market 
economies; oligarchic or clientelistic capitalist economies; order states; and remittance- and aid-dependent 
countries (see Table 1.3). 
 
<place Table 1.1, Table 1.2, Table 1.3 about here> 
 
This literature also questions the general assumption that the former communist countries embarked on the 
process of transition from similar starting points. This is because from an economic point of view some 
countries were significantly better than others before the collapse of the communist regime. For instance, 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) already had higher levels of industrialization compared to 
many smaller countries, which had significantly weaker levels of industrialization and served primarily as 
producers and suppliers of raw materials during the Soviet rule. In addition, there are countries in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that were significant oil and gas producers and possessed vast 
reserves of natural resources. This means that smaller countries with weak industrial capacities and insignificant 
oil and gas resources faced a tougher transition path compared to the other two groups (Myant and Drahokoupil, 
2011, p. xix). Subsequent divergence in transition paths was further influenced by a broad policy approach 
adopted by major international institutions that somewhat erroneously assumed that a generic policy package, 
consisting of two opposing methods of µshock-therapy¶ and µgradualism¶, would be appropriate to all transition 
countries (ibid.). They failed to consider specific policy needs of individual countries and instead focused on the 
agenda to prioritize speedy implementation of different transitional requirements, such as liberalization of 
prices, international trade and banking activities, legalization of private enterprise, privatization, and sharp 
minimization in state intervention. While this approach indeed benefited some countries, it did not produce 
expected results in countries with weaker capacities to absorb and implement the suggested policy package, 
thereby necessarily affecting the outcomes of the transition process in these countries. 
Whilst many of these states continue to be collectively labelled as transition economies, and may be 
deemed to have similar political economies, the aforementioned literature highlights the significant divergence 
that has taken place in the nature and direction of transition among the group. The tables and their classifications 
suggest that the nature and outcomes of transition appear to vary significantly; authors report that whilst many 
countries have completed the process, and many others are in the process of transformation, there are also a 
 number of countries where the transition has barely commenced. Further, it is noted here that this diversity of 
transition shapes the process of institutional development and influences the specific type of market economic 
system that is being constructed in particular countries (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2012). This implies significant 
YDULDWLRQLQWKHVHFRXQWULHV¶HPHUJLQJLQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQWH[WV It is important to acknowledge that attempts have 
been made in the aforementioned business and management literature to emphasize the heterogeneity in 
institutional contexts. For instance, IB scholars distinguish between WKHµELJ EDQJ¶versus the more gradual 
model of transition adopted by the larger economies of Russia and China, respectively (Buck et al., 2000; Hitt et 
al., 2004; Tsang, 1996), while the SME and entrepreneurship scholars distinguish between transition economies 
with more advanced and less advanced market reforms (Smallbone and Welter, 2001b, 2012). However, it is 
observed that no corresponding attention has been paid to smaller post-Soviet economies in the periphery, and 
more importantly, no conceptual link has been made to this particular strand of comparative institutionalism 
literature, which places emphasis on the direction and nature of the transition process, in addition to the speed of 
transition (Makhmadshoev et al., 2015). This suggests a need to better understand the implications of the 
varieties of transition on firm behaviour. This observation is particularly timely, given that the comparative 
institutionalism approach is rapidly gaining ground within wider business and management literature (Jackson 
and Deeg, 2008; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hotho and Pedersen, 2012). 
 
<b>Utility of the VoT for the Transitional Periphery: Some Empirical Evidence 
As stated in the previous section, a key argument of the VoT approach is that the formerly planned economies 
may be developing diverse national institutional environments as a result of experiencing divergent paths to the 
transition process. By drawing upon insights obtained through original fieldwork in Central Asia and integrating 
these with empirical evidence gathered from publicly available sources, this section demonstrates the usefulness 
of this argument and further cautions researchers that it may be erroneous to attribute countries in the 
transitional periphery, and indeed transitional countries in general, as a homogenous category in relation to their 
institutional configurations (Makhmadshoev et al., 2015). 
One of the key and somewhat unanticipated findings of the fieldwork conducted in the Central Asian 
countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was that despite their similarities and common Soviet heritage, the 
institutional environments of the two countries were found to be similar but different. This partly accounted for 
differences in the impact of institutional contexts on firm behaviour in the two countries. Tajikistan gained 
independence in September 1991 following the break-up of the Soviet Union and almost immediately entered a 
state of civil war, which ended only in 1997 (Heathershaw, 2009). This political reality effectively delayed, and 
perhaps even derailed, the start of the transition process, and the country was unable to fully initiate the 
programme of structural reforms until the end of the crisis (EBRD, 2002; Rakhimov et al., 2003). In contrast, 
Kyrgyzstan avoided any major internal conflicts after gaining independence. With the West-oriented, liberal-
minded Askar Akayev elected as its first President, Kyrgyzstan rapidly adopted a radical transition programme 
promoted by major international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, which in turn was informed by the so-called Washington Consensus (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011, p. 
xx), and focused on pursuing important measures to stabilize macroeconomic and financial situation, liberalize 
prices and commercial activity, and promote privatization and denationalization (Dabrowski and Antczak, 1995; 
Jermakowicz et al., 1995). Subsequently, in 1993, it became the first of the CIS countries to introduce its own 
currency (Slay, 1995), and one of the first to liberalize its foreign trade (Dabrowski and Antczak, 1995). Success 
in economic reforms soon resulted in Kyrgyzstan becoming the first of all former Soviet republics to gain 
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 1998, an important milestone for the economic 
(re)integration of Kyrgyzstan with the outside world. 
Tajikistan, at least initially, has been included in the category of µslow reformers¶ along with the likes 
of Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (EBRD, 2002, p. 79). According to the World Bank (2013a), which 
SURYLGHVRQHRIWKHZLGHO\XVHGLQGLFDWRUVIRUUHJXODWRU\UHIRUPV7DMLNLVWDQ¶VEXVLQHVVUHJXODWLRQVDUHRQHRI
the least favourable amongst the former Soviet republics, including those in the transitional periphery (see Table 
1.4). It stands at 128 in the overall ranking of 190 countries on Ease of Doing Business, which does not compare 
favourably with other countries in the transitional periphery. However, in terms of reforms relating to economic 
integration, some important and positive steps have been taken in order to liberalize foreign trade, remove cross-
border barriers to trade, and attract foreign direct investment (FDI). For example, a resolution was adopted by 
the government on foreign trade liberalization in 1995 (UNESCAP, 2001); export duties were abolished to 
facilitate foreign trade; and new legislation on foreign investment was adopted in 1992 to attract FDI and 
encourage foreign investors to participate in privatization. With the introduction of a new law on investments in 
2007, significant legal improvements were made in protecting the rights of investors (World Bank, 2013b). In 
addition, Tajikistan applied for membership of the WTO in 2001, and after many years of negotiations was 
accepted as a member in 2013, becoming only the second country in Central Asia, following the Kyrgyz 
Republic, to achieve this (Kazakhstan also joined later in 2015). 
<place Table 1.4 about here> 
  
According to various observers, .\UJ\]VWDQ¶VEXVLQHVVUHJXODWLRQVDUHVRPHRIWKHPRVWIDYRXUDEOHDPRQJVWWKH
former Soviet republics, and considerably more favourable when compared to other countries in the Central 
Asian periphery (perhaps excluding Kazakhstan, which has moved up the World Bank rankings in recent years). 
It appears to have achieved the most progress in reforms among its Central Asian neighbours in accordance with 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)¶VWUDQVLWLRQLQGLFDWRUV, and its average score 
of the six indicators suggests that its progress has been almost comparable to Armenia and Georgia, making 
them the three leading countries in terms of reforms in the transitional periphery (see Table 1.5). A number of 
key regulatory improvements have been made in Kyrgyzstan in areas of taxation and foreign trade, which have 
had a positive impact on domestic and international activities of firms. Further to abolishing export duties in the 
early 1990s, and reducing the number of export documents (World Bank, 2013c), in 2008 the implementation of 
the Single Window project commenced in Kyrgyzstan, which was aimed at facilitating foreign trade by means 
of simplifying customs procedures and reducing various inefficiencies and costs associated with imports and 
exports. 
<place Table 1.5 about here> 
 
Also worthy of discussion are the observed differences in the political sphere that may have acted as an 
important factor behind the divergent transition processes in the two countries, and which may have contributed 
to the development of potentially different institutional environments for firms (see, e.g., Makhmadshoev and 
Crone, 2014; Makhmadshoev et al., 2015). In SDUWLFXODU.\UJ\]VWDQ¶s unprecedented changes in its political 
landscape over the last decade have cemented a certain revolutionary culture in the country, indicating the 
apparent determination of its people to reject authoritarianism and instead push further towards democracy and 
economic freedom. Indeed, Kyrgyzstan, unlike many of its post-Soviet neighbours, followed a more liberal and 
a more democratic path to transition (Matveeva, 2009). Askar Akayev, the first president elected after the 
independence, became a popular figure in the West for his open and liberal views, and was famously described 
as a µJeffersonian democrat in the heart of Asia¶ (Merry, 2004, p. 296). However, a series of µauthoritarian 
moves¶ by Akayev in late 1990s and early 2000s, such as stricter control of mass media, election rigging and 
increasing nepotism, led to the Tulip revolution in 2005, which saw the dramatic overthrow of his regime 
(Collins, 2009; Tudoroiu, 2007, p. 331). Despite such an extraordinary end to his rule, many still consider 
Akayev, formerly a member and head of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, a key architect RI.\UJ\]VWDQ¶V
more liberal and progressive transition course. This historic event, the first of its kind in the post-Soviet Central 
Asia, VHWWKHVWDJHIRUWKHVXEVHTXHQWRYHUWKURZLQRI$ND\HY¶VVXFFHVVRU.XUPDQEHN%DNLHYZKRZDV
overthrown for reasons similar to his predecessor. In 2010 Roza Otunbayeva became an interim president, until 
Almazbek Atambayev became the newly elected president of the Kyrgyz Republic in December 2011. In 
accordance with the Constitution, the country elected a new president in October 2017, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, 
and for the first time in post-Soviet Central Asia power was transferred peacefully from one elected president to 
another.  
In neighbouring Tajikistan, by contrast, the government vowed to undertake structural changes and 
implement market reforms in the early years of transition, and thereby appealed for technical and financial 
assistance from foreign governments and international organizations. Yet, almost three decades into the 
transition, some core features of the planned economy remain widespread, such as the state monopoly of 
economically important sectors, control over exchange and interest rates, and state intervention in the banking 
sector (EBRD, 2010, 2012). Coupled with hesitation by the state over taking on the implementation of market 
reforms more rigorously, it is likely that instead of a market system Tajikistan may be heading towards some 
form of state capitalism, if any form of capitalism at all. Thus far the nature of transition in Kyrgyzstan has been 
fundamentally different to any of the countries in the Central Asian periphery, but comparable to that of Georgia 
in the Caucasus, where a similar Rose revolution took place in 2003 which saw the fall of the Shevarnadze 
regime (Tudoroiu, 2007). This served as a basis for implementing liberal market reforms, opening the economy 
to competition and investment, and fostering stronger ties with the West. The parallels that can be drawn 
between the transition experiences of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan suggest that their national institutional 
environments, and subsequently their effects on firms, are bound to be different when compared to other 
countries in the transitional periphery. 7KLVFKDSWHU¶Vanalysis and the empirical evidence provided in the tables 
also suggest that countries in the transitional periphery are, in effect, moving from institutional convergence to 
institutional divergence. 
Table 1.6, which is a summary of fieldwork responses to how firms in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
perceive their national institutional environments, supports the VoT argument on the existence of divergence in 
the outcomes of transition. In particular, analysis of the findings suggests that formal institutions in Kyrgyzstan 
are generally more advanced (that is, better designed) from a regulatory point of view. This was found to have a 
positive influence on firm behaviour (note that the firms studied were SMEs in the cotton, textile and garment 
sectors in the two countries). It was also suggested that formal institutions have a positive impact on firm 
 activity because they help to reduce formal and informal transaction costs. Firms in Kyrgyzstan were observed 
to incur lower transaction costs because more developed formal institutions, in principle, suggest more efficient 
transactions. Accordingly, a more advanced formal institutional environment in Kyrgyzstan suggests a more 
successful transition to the market mechanism and, thus, lower transaction costs for firms. North (1990) 
indicates that the underlying institutional frameworks in the society can either reinforce or discourage firms 
from engaging in economic activity. Research findings on formal institutions seem to reflect this assumption. 
Formal institutions in Tajikistan act to increase transaction and production costs, create a range of regulatory 
obstacles to exporting, and provide few (if any) incentives for firms; whereas in Kyrgyzstan, formal institutions 
generally act to reduce transaction costs and export-related regulatory barriers and, in addition, provide certain 
incentives for firms to engage in the production and exports of textiles and garments. This comparative example 
clearly illustrates diversity in formal institutional contexts, as well as how institutions can both constrain and 
IDFLOLWDWHILUPV¶HFRQRPLFDFWLYLWLHV. 
<place Table 1.6 about here> 
 
In understanding the variation in the influence of informal institutions between the two countries, the key 
explanation lies, at least partly, with the quality of formal institutions and the mechanism of their enforcement 
and implementation, which according to the CC and VoT theorists amounts to institutional complementarity. In 
this study, formal institutions were found to be more advanced and more effectively enforced in Kyrgyzstan 
compared to Tajikistan. For instance, lower tax rates and the simplified system of tax calculation in the Kyrgyz 
case signal more optimal tax rules, and thus more advanced formal institutions. This shows the intent of the 
Kyrgyz state to create a regulatory environment which encourages competition (by enabling more firms to enter 
the private sector) and discourages state intervention (by reducing the influence of tax inspectors on firms), 
thereby making the regulatory environment more in line with the principles of the market economy (Furubotn 
and Richter, 2000). The relatively strong implementation of this law has added more transparency in 
interactions between state officials and businesses and, importantly, resulted in a significant decline of the level 
and frequency of informal payments made by firms to tax officials. This example demonstrates how more 
advanced formal institutions have contributed to reforming undesirable informal institutions by making the 
latter less prevalent, and thus less constraining for firms. This portrays a contrasting yet analytically consistent 
picture with regard to the case of Tajikistan, where the reverse line of argumentation (that is, weak formal 
institutions contributed to informal institutions becoming more prevalent, and thus more constraining for firms) 
was found to be applicable. Indeed, it was one of the key emerging findings of the fieldwork that institutions 
have developed, and therefore function, differently in the two seemingly similar post-Soviet states; 
consequently, their influence on firm behaviour appears to vary also. 
 
<a>ACTOR-CENTRED PERSPECTIVE ON INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Though I do not offer empirical evidence to support the utility of this institutional perspective, I argue 
conceptually for its importance and relevance in furthering the current thinking on institutions and the firm in 
the transition periphery. An increasing number of scholars have recently called for more attention to be given to 
better understanding the role of economic actors, as well as the mechanisms they deploy, in shaping the process 
of institutional change in transition economies (Kalantaridis, 2007; Puffer et al., 2010; Welter and Smallbone, 
2011). This can be seen as part of the broader debate to give greater emphasis to agency in institutional research, 
which is described by Carney et al. (2009, p. 361) as µthe second movement in institutional theory¶. In response 
to this call, one can point to the pertinence of an emerging yet hitherto underexplored perspective on 
institutional change, which is informed by the works of Campbell (1997, 2004) in the areas of rational choice 
institutionalism and institutional economics. Though the neo-institutional perspective discussed earlier, and in 
particular the seminal work of North (1990), places considerable emphasis on understanding the process of 
institutional change and its importance for economic development (North, 2005), a key limitation of this 
approach is that the mechanisms through which institutional change may be manifested are, arguably, poorly 
specified (Campbell, 2004). Indeed, as the review of this approach earlier demonstrated, emphasis is placed 
predominantly on unpacking the meaning of institutions and analysing how they interact and change at a macro 
level. Thus, Campbell (2004, p. 88) argues that µany account of how institutions are build or affect social 
behaviour requires a micro-level account of actors as causal agents¶. Examining the utility of the approach 
which places more emphasis on actors or firms as institutional players in probing into the transition economies, 
albeit conceptually, fits well with the broader objective of this book, which is to advance more firm-centred 
perspectives. 
It has been suggested by a number of institutionally focused scholars that the emergence of capitalist 
institutions in the former planned economies follows a certain path-dependent or evolutionary process 
(Campbell, 2004; Smallbone and Welter, 2006; Welter and Smallbone, 2011). This is reflected in the reality 
where the formal institutions in many transition economies are being replaced and redesigned, but the informal 
institutions developed during the Soviet times and entrenched in norms and traditions continue to dominate 
 economic and social behaviours, including those of the firm (Peng and Heath, 1996). While scholars use the 
concept of path-dependence to examine the development of economic institutions in post communist countries 
(Manolova et al., 2010; Smallbone and Welter, 2012; Stark and Bruszt, 1998; Zweynert, 2006), what has often 
been missing in such analyses is elaboration of the specific mechanisms through which path-dependent 
institutional change could be manifested and explained (Kalantaridis, 2007). As Campbell (2004, p. 66) states in 
this regard, µthe difficulty is that the mechanisms whereby path-dependent effects occur are often poorly 
specified, if not completely neglected¶. To address this limitation, the concept of µbricolage¶ is identified, which 
is underexploited in institutional studies (with the exception of some, including Carney et al., 2009; Lanzara, 
1998; Phillips and Tracey, 2007), yet represents a notion well suited to enhancing our understanding of path-
dependent evolutionary institutional change: the type that prevails in countries transitioning from communism to 
capitalism (Campbell, 2004). This section now turns to analysing the pertinence of bricolage. 
 
<b>Bricolage 
Originally introduced by anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, the term µbricolage¶ characterizes a certain way of 
acting in the society whereby actors use existing resources and instruments, or µwhatever is at hand¶, to make do 
(Levi-Strauss, 1966, p. 17). Baker and Nelson¶V (2005) seminal paper is widely viewed to have laid the 
foundations for building the theory of bricolage in entrepreneurship and wider management research. They 
define bricolage as µmaking do by applying combinations of the resources at hand to new problems and 
opportunities¶ (Baker and Nelson, 2005, p. $FFRUGLQJWRWKLVGHILQLWLRQµPDNLQJGR¶UHIHUVWRDVSHFLILF
attitude of actors in refusing to accept the various institutional limitations imposed by their operating 
environments. Instead, they focus on combining a variety of existing resources available cheaply or freely (? 
including skills, capabilities, financial and physical resources (씀 to create new solutions to problems or to explore 
new business opportunities. Stinchfield et al. (2013) posit that resources at hand may include µphysical, artifacts, 
skills or ideas¶ that actors can draw upon when faced with opportunities or obstacles. Baker and Nelson (2005) 
further suggest that actors can engage in bricolage across five areas or domains, namely physical inputs, labour 
inputs, skills inputs, customers and markets, and institutional and regulatory environment. 
Thus, actors can make do not only by redesigning and reapplying physical and social resources, but 
also by reshaping a variety of institutional and regulatory elements available at hand. Indeed, a growing number 
of studies have emphasized the institutional utility of bricolage (DiDomenico et al., 2010; Fisher, 2012; Phillips 
and Tracey, 2007). Among these are Carney et al. (2009), who suggest that the concept is highly relevant in 
understanding the process whereby actors combine different institutional elements to develop new types of 
institutions or reconfigure existing ones to address new challenges. In a similar spirit, Desa (2012) and Mair and 
Marti (2009) have also demonstrated how actors engage in bricolage to fill various voids in resource-depleted 
and institutionally challenging environments. The former, for instance, noted that µbricolage acts as an 
entrepreneurial response mechanism that reconfigures macro institutional environments¶ (Desa, 2012, p. 743). 
Importantly, scholars also suggest that bricolage as a mechanism is not just about creating something 
from resources available at hand, or bringing together different institutional elements to address a certain 
problem, but is also about shaping the process of institutional development (Carney et al., 2009; Campbell, 
2004; Desa, 2012; Mair and Marti, 2009; Phillips and Tracey, 2007). For instance, Desa (2012, p. 730) states 
that actors who engage in bricolage are also participants of µa process of actor-initiated institutional change¶. 
Campbell (2010, p. 98) who advocates bricolage specifically as a mechanism of path-dependent, incremental 
institutional change, describes it as the process or mechanism through which institutional change may involve 
µthe rearrangement or recombination of institutional principles and practices in new and creative ways¶. 
Through engagement in bricolage actors can change existing institutions or create new ones by infusing 
elements of their old and newly imported institutional systems (Campbell, 2004). Thereby, bricolage can be 
seen as an appropriate, firm-centred perspective with great potential to enhance our understanding of the 
behaviour, activity and creativity of economic actors and firms in the context of transition economies, where 
institutions are, by definition, in a state of flux and where such actors can play a significant role in the formation 
and co-creation of institutional systems (Tracey and Phillips, 2011). In other words, the concept has potential to 
offer an appropriate micro-level perspective on how economic actors can influence institutions, thereby 
complementing the established macro-level perspective discussed earlier in the chapter on how institutional 
structures influence economic actors. In this way, exploring the notion of bricolage can shed fresh light on the 
duality between institutions and actors, and thereby contribute to furthering the current thinking on institutions 
and the firm in the transitional periphery. 
 
<a>CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that researchers in recent years have benefited significantly by drawing on institutional 
theory to explore and explain the various effects of unstable institutional settings and embedded institutional 
factors on firm behaviour in transitional environments. It has highlighted that the neo-institutionalist approach, 
and in particular the North-inspired new institutional economics lens, tends to represent the most dominant 
 approach adopted by many business and management scholars with an interest in post-socialist economies. 
While acknowledging that this perspective remains powerful and effective to this day, the chapter has proposed 
that research in this area can potentially benefit in important ways by integrating insights from two emerging, 
but hitherto underexploited institutional perspecWLYHVQDPHO\FRPSDUDWLYHFDSLWDOLVP¶Vvarieties of transition 
approach and the more actor-centred perspective on institutional change. In other words, the conceptual and 
empirical analyses, and the suggestion to integrate insights from the two emerging institutional approaches, 
signify that the nature of questions asked within the literature on institutions and the firm in transition 
economies can, and perhaps should, be broadened to include not only various deterministic questions relating to 
how institutions influence the behaviour of the firm, but also what are the implications of institutional diversity 
on firm behaviour DQGZKDWLVWKHILUP¶VUROH, if any, as a creative and rational actor in influencing the process 
of institutional change in these transitional environments. 
More than 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet regime, it becomes apparent that the process of 
transition in former Soviet republics has not followed the intended progression towards Western models of 
capitalism; to the contrary, various paths have emerged, resulting in the varieties of capitalism in transition 
economies. Literature suggests that only the Baltic states and countries of the former Communist bloc of Eastern 
and Central Europe can be considered to have completed the process of transition, whilst many others, including 
those in the periphery, have mostly stalled, stagnated or derailed. The varieties of transition approach points that 
this divergence in the transition process among the former communist states translates into a great number of 
institutional configurations at national levels. This institutional divergence is likely to widen, resulting in further 
variation between national institutions, which in turn obliges researchers to start asking not only how 
institutions matter in transition economies, but also how differences in institutions matter. Thus, exploring the 
heterogeneity of institutional contexts, and placing more emphasis on understanding the increasingly important 
role of economic actors in influencing the process of institutional transformation, can lead researchers to 
important new insights on the relationship between institutions and the firm in the transitional periphery. 
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 Table 1.1<em>Typology of emerging capitalisms in post-communist states, as per Lane 
 
Post-communist states Typology 
State-led capitalism: 
Slovenia, Czech 
Republic, Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia, 
Estonia, Lithuania, 
Croatia, Latvia, 
Romania, Bulgaria 
&ORVHVWWRµ&RQWLQHQWDO¶form of market capitalism; levels of marketization and 
privatization comparable to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) states; high exposure to the global economy and large 
private sectors; embedded welfare states make them comparable to continental 
European model of capitalism; some have greater state coordination, but all have 
developed economic, political and societal preconditions of capitalism. 
Extent of transition: transition almost complete. 
Hybrid state/market 
uncoordinated 
capitalism: 
Russian Federation, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Georgia, Moldova 
Economically poorer group, with high levels of poverty, inflation and 
XQHPSOR\PHQWZHDNJRYHUQLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVOHGWRµXQVXFFHVVIXO¶SHULRGRI
WUDQVLWLRQDQGDSHULRGRIµFKDRWLFFDSLWDOLVP¶SXUVXHGSULYDWL]DWLRQEXWH[SRVXUH
to the global economy remains low; have low levels of domestic investment; 
contexts characterized by high institutional uncertainty, corruption, and rent-
seeking entrepreneurs; all countries lack psychological, political and societal 
preconditions to support modern capitalism. 
Extent of transition: only group to assume a µtransitionary¶ status. 
Transition laggards or 
statist economies: 
Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Belarus  
Countries in the group deemed not to have made breakthrough to a capitalist 
system; contexts characterized by high levels of state coordination and 
bureaucratic control, and low levels of private ownership and exposure to the 
global economy; key economic functions, internal and external, continue to be 
controlled by the state or state-owned corporations. 
Extent of transition: no significant progress toward the transition. 
 
Source:<em>Complied by author from Lane (2007, pp. 35-37). 
 
 
Table 1.2<em>Variation in transition outcomes in post-communist states, as per Havrylyshyn 
 
Post-communist states Key characteristics 
Liberal societies: 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Croatia, 
Bulgaria, Romania 
Developed and well-functioning market economies; 
liberal democratic systems; 
avoided development of oligarchic tendencies; 
high performance on economic and social indicators; 
most countries achieved European Union (EU) membership; 
transition is complete in most countries. 
Intermediate regimes: 
Albania, Macedonia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, 
Kyrgyzstan 
Significant degree of rent-seeking and oligarchic tendencies in the economy 
and state policy, but receding; 
mid-range performance on economic and social indicators; 
future EU membership gives reform incentive to some; 
gradually but firmly moving towards liberal states. 
Captured states: 
Russian Federation, 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, 
Moldova, Armenia, 
Tajikistan 
Existence of powerful µeconomic oligarchy¶; 
low levels of competition in economy and state policy; 
insufficient evolution toward market institutions; 
economic and social indicators on the lower end of scale; 
transition very slow and sluggish in most cases. 
Lagging reformers: 
Belarus, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Limited progress in terms of market reforms; 
insignificant liberalization and privatization; 
role of state in the economy and polity remains dominant; 
transition in all of these countries µhas barely started¶. 
 
Source:<em>Compiled by author from Havrylyshyn (2006, pp. 261(?263). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1.3<em>Varieties of capitalism in transition economies, as per Myant and Drahokoupil 
 
Varieties of capitalism Key characteristics 
FDI-based market 
economies: 
Central-Eastern European 
countries 
Democratic political systems and EU integration; 
strong export structures built around inbound FDI; 
second-rank positions within global value chains; 
sound domestic environments for private sector growth. 
Peripheral market 
economies: 
The Baltics and South-
Eastern European countries 
Democratic political systems and EU membership; 
conducive institutions for private sector development; 
less stable export structure based on manufacturing; 
weak domestic economies and open to external shocks; 
dependence on remittances and lower welfare provisions. 
Oligarchic or clientelistic 
capitalism: 
Most countries in the CIS 
Close ties between business and politics; 
weakly developed environment for new businesses; 
levels of social and employment protection are low; 
weak exports and low levels of domestic investment; 
µrelatively authoritarian political systems¶. 
Order state capitalism: 
CIS countries with limited 
reforms 
Some degree of integration into the global economy; 
prevalence of state ownership and control of economy; 
exports dominated by commodities and raw materials; 
also characterized by µauthoritarian political systems¶. 
Remittance- and aid-based 
economies 
Low-income CIS and 
Eastern European states 
Weak bases for economic transformation; 
weak environments for private sector development; 
adversely affected by peripheral geographical locations; 
dominated by domestic-oriented entrepreneurship; 
potential to develop into MNE subcontracting locations. 
 
Source:<em>Compiled by author from Myant and Drahokoupil (2011, pp. 310(?312). 
 Table 1.4<em>Indicators of the institutional environment for countries in transitional periphery 
 
Doing Business 
indicators 
Ease of doing 
business ranking 
Starting a business 
ranking 
Getting credit 
ranking 
Paying taxes 
ranking 
Trading across 
borders ranking 
Year 2007 2017 2007 2017 2007 2017 2007 2017 2007 2017 
Case study countries           
Tajikistan 133 128 166 85 143 118 154 140 163 144 
Kyrgyzstan 90 75 41 30 65 32 150 148 173 79 
Rest of Central Asia           
Kazakhstan 63 35 40 45 48 75 66 60 172 119 
Uzbekistan  147 87 70 25 159 44 155 138 169 165 
Turkmenistan n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 
Caucasus           
Armenia 34 38 46 9 65 20 148 88 119 48 
Azerbaijan  99 65 96 5 21 118 136 40 158 83 
Georgia 37 16 36 8 48 7 104 22 95 54 
 
Notes: 
2007 ranking (1(?175); 2017 ranking (1(?190). 
n/d = no data. 
Ease of Doing Business, Starting a Business, Getting Credit, Paying Taxes and Trading Across Borders are rankings of up to 190 countries and examine business regulations 
as they apply to local firms. 
 
Sources:<em>All indicators from World Bank µ'RLQJ%XVLQHVV¶UHSRUWV, http://www.doingbusiness.org (accessed 8 March 2017). 
 
  
 Table 1.5<em>EBRD transition indicators for countries in transitional periphery 
 
Transition 
indicators 
LSP SCP G&ER PL T&FS CP Average of six 
indicators 
Year 1991 2014 1991 2014 1991 2014 1991 2014 1991 2014 1991 2014 1991 2014 
Case study 
countries 
              
Tajikistan 1.0 2.3 1.0 4.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 4.0 1.0 3.7 1.0 1.7 1.0 2.95 
Kyrgyzstan 1.0 3.7 1.0 4.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 4.3 1.0 4.3 1.0 2.0 1.0 3.38 
Rest of Central 
Asia 
              
Kazakhstan 1.0 3.0 1.0 4.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 3.7 1.0 3.7 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.9 
Uzbekistan 1.0 2.7 1.0 3.3 1.0 1.7 1.0 2.7 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.7 1.0 2.3 
Turkmenistan  1.0 1.0 1.0 2.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 2.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.76 
Caucasus               
Armenia 1.0 3.7 1.0 4.0 1.0 2.3 1.0 4.0 1.0 4.3 1.0 2.3 1.0 3.43 
Azerbaijan  1.0 2.0 1.0 3.7 1.0 2.0 1.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 2.9 
Georgia 1.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 1.0 2.3 1.0 4.3 1.0 4.3 1.0 2.0 1.0 3.48 
 
Notes: 
LSP ± large-scale privatization; SCP ± small-scale privatization; G&ER ± governance and enterprise restructuring; PL ± price liberalization; T&FS ± trade and foreign 
exchange system; CP (? competition policy.  
The measurement scale for the indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 4+ represents the standards 
of an industrialized market economy. The last column shows a simple average of six EBRD indicators 
 
Source:<em>$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQ(%5'WUDQVLWLRQLQGLFDWRUVGDWD, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data (accessed 8 March 2017). 
 
 
  
 Table 1.6<em>Comparative analysis of fieldwork data highlighting differences in institutional contexts in two countries in the transitional periphery 
 
 Perception of formal institutional context Perception of informal institutional context Representative quotes from fieldwork 
Country A: 
Tajikistan 
Regulative environment in general is 
unpredictable and complex. 
Tax rules change frequently and compliance with 
tax rules is complex and costly. 
Frequent and unannounced visits by state 
inspectors (i.e., taxation, standardization, fire and 
other state agencies and bodies). 
Process of exporting is complicated and time-
consuming. 
Process of obtaining export-related documents is 
difficult and lengthy. 
Firms¶ overall view of the formal institutional 
environment is largely negative, with little 
optimism for tangible improvements. 
Informal (personal) relations play an important 
role in business survival. 
Informal relations play an important role in 
facilitating exporting and reducing bureaucratic 
hurdles associated with it. 
Informal relations play an important role in 
gaining privileged access to resources and 
protecting property. 
Informal costs of doing business are 
unnecessarily high for private firms. 
Firms without (personal) informal relationships 
have fewer chances of survival and success 
compared to those with strong connections. 
µTheoretically speaking, the legal framework is 
not bad . . . the government is taking certain steps 
to improve the legislation to help SMEs grow, but 
the actual implementation of new laws and 
policies is poor in practice.¶ 
µThe main problem is with the practical side of it ± 
the operating mechanism of the taxation system.¶ 
µ«having close relationships, for example with 
the governor of the region, helps you immensely . 
. . such contacts are absolutely important [for firm 
survival and success]¶ 
 
Country B: 
Kyrgyzstan 
 
 
 
Regulative environment is more predictable. 
Norms and practices of tax inspection regime are 
more conducive to firms, with fewer visits by tax 
inspectors and lower informal costs. 
Rules of paying and calculating taxes are 
improving and less constraining than in past (and 
compared to Tajikistan). 
Process of exporting is relatively simpler and less 
burdensome than in past (and compared to 
Tajikistan). 
Experience of obtaining export-related 
documentation is relatively easy and fast, and not 
very costly. 
)LUPV¶RYHUDOOYLHZRIWKHIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQDO
environment is largely positive, with more 
optimism for further improvements. 
Informal personal relations are notably less 
important (than before, and compared to 
Tajikistan) for business survival and success, 
but play some role. 
Informal relations are less important in 
facilitating exporting. 
Informal relations are important in a similar way 
as in Tajikistan in gaining access to key 
resources and protecting property. 
Informal costs lower than in Tajikistan, due to 
enhanced tax and export regulations. 
Possible for firms without strong informal 
connections to survive and succeed, due to the 
diminishing nature of informality in the country, 
which is partly the result of unprecedented 
political changes. 
µ«ZHGRQ¶WKDYHDQ\SUREOHPVZLWKWKHWD[DWLRQ
system. Tax rates in my opinion are OK. I mean, 
ZHGRQ¶WSD\WRRPDQ\W\SHVRIWD[HVMXVWWKUHHRU
four¶ 
µ«since several years ago, I think since 2008, the 
legal framework has become more or less positive 
and unproblematic for firms¶ 
µInformal connections were important in the past, 
because the regulation was complex . . . But it is 
no longer like this . . . I guess it is good for you if 
you have connections and influential relatives, but 
I am not sure it can help your business as much [as 
in the past].¶ 
 
Sources:<em>Own fieldwork; adapted from Makhmadshoev and Crone (2014) and Makhmadshoev et al. (2015). 
